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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),1 
commonly but imprecisely referred to as “Superfund,”2 for the 
dual purposes of promoting “timely cleanup of hazardous waste 
sites, and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were 
borne by those responsible for the contamination.”3 Conversely, 
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act4 to, among other things, 
“protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources 
so as to promote the public health”5 and encourage “the 
development and operation of regional air pollution prevention 
and control programs.”6 Thus, CERCLA generally provides for 
the cleanup of land and water at sites that have already been 
contaminated to such a degree that they pose a threat to 
human health or the environment, while the Clean Air Act 
regulates ongoing emissions for the purpose of improving or 
maintaining ambient air quality. Because the two laws have 
very different aims and are implemented differently, judicial 
                                               
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). 
2. The term “Superfund” more precisely refers to the trust fund created by CERCLA 
that the Environmental Protection Agency can use to clean up contaminated sites and 
pursue contributions from responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2015). 
3. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States (Burlington Northern), 556 
U.S. 599, 602 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). 
4. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401–7671q (2012). 
5. Id. § 7401(b)(1). 
6. Id. § 7401(b)(4). 
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decisions that do not properly account for these differences 
could open a hole in coverage where one did not previously 
exist. Specifically, recent court decisions narrowly interpreting 
the key CERCLA terms “arrange” and “disposal,”7 if construed 
too broadly, could render entities that aerially emit hazardous 
substances that contaminate a site immune from liability. This 
potential hole in coverage could result in the failure to clean up 
contaminated sites, threatening human health and the 
environment, and in taxpayers or other innocent parties 
paying for the cleanup—either result would frustrate 
congressional intent. 
Two cases in the Ninth Circuit, one decided recently and the 
other pending on appeal, place the issue in sharp relief. In the 
first case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Center for 
Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF Railway 
Co. (CCAEJ)8 held that diesel particulate matter emitted from 
defendant’s rail yards did not result in the “disposal”9 of solid 
waste, and therefore was not subject to the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).10 While RCRA, “our 
nation’s primary law governing the disposal of solid and 
hazardous waste,”11 and CERCLA, independently regulate 
existing and former facilities, respectively, the two are related. 
In imposing liability on “any person who . . . arranged for 
                                               
7. See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1020–
21 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “emission of diesel particulate matter does not 
constitute ‘disposal’ of solid waste”); Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 600 (holding 
that “an entity may qualify as an arranger [only] when it takes intentional steps to 
dispose of a hazardous substance”); United States v. Gen. Elec.Co., 670 F.3d 377, 384 
(1st Cir. 2012) (stating that “Burlington Northern clarified that § 9607(a)(3) liability 
may only attach in cases where a person or entity has the distinctly apparent objective 
of disposing of its hazardous substances”); Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal 
Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the passive migration of 
contamination did not amount to disposal). 
8. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co. (CCAEJ), 764 F.3d 1019, 
1030 (9th Cir. 2014). 
9. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act defines disposal as “the discharge, 
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or 
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous 
waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air 
or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012). 
10. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k 
(2012). 
11. History of RCRA, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/rcra/history-resource-conservation-
and-recovery-act-rcra (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (stating that RCRA is “our nation’s 
primary law governing the disposal of solid and hazardous waste”). 
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disposal . . .of hazardous substances . . . at any facility,”12 
CERCLA relies on RCRA’s definition of “disposal.”13 While the 
RCRA definition of disposal applies to both laws, it must be 
construed in the different contexts of each regulatory scheme. 
A broad reading of CCAEJ as holding that aerial emissions can 
never result in disposal of hazardous substances, without 
considering the differences between RCRA and CERCLA, could 
open a hole in coverage between the Clean Air Act and 
CERCLA. Under this interpretation, if a facility’s hazardous 
gas emissions do not violate the Clean Air Act, and yet 
contaminate a site, parties affected by the contamination 
would have no recourse in federal court against those 
responsible, and the federal government may not be able to 
replenish site cleanup costs taken from the Superfund.14 
In the second case, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. 
(Pakootas II),15 Teck Resources Limited (Teck), a mining and 
smelting company operating in the state of Washington and 
across the border in Canada, is currently advancing this theory 
in the Ninth Circuit. In Pakootas II, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Washington recently ruled 
against Teck, narrowly interpreting CCAEJ in the CERCLA 
context. The district court held that hazardous substances 
emitted into the air from defendant’s smelter, which is not 
subject to the Clean Air Act because it is located in Canada, 
were “disposed” at a CERCLA “facility” not when they were 
discharged into the air, but when they were deposited on land 
and water on plaintiffs’ site in the Upper Columbia River in 
Washington.16 The district court, therefore, concluded that 
Teck was responsible for its pollution of the Upper Columbia 
River site as arrangers for disposal of hazardous substances 
                                               
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added to highlight CERCLA terms of 
art). 
13. Id. § 9601(29) (2012) (“disposal . . . shall have the meaning provided in section 
1004 of” RCRA). 
14. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012) (listing covered person from whom costs 
can be recovered). 
15. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas II), No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 
WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (to distinguish the different issues at play, 
and to highlight similarities, this paper uses the short form Pakootas II when referring 
to the subject of this paper—Teck’s aerial emissions from the Trail Smelter, and the 
short form Pakootas I when referring to Teck’s discharge of slag and other hazardous 
waste directly into the Columbia River. See infra note 93.). 
16. Pakootas II, No. CV-04-256-LRS, slip op. at 2. 
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under CERCLA §107(a)(3).17 At Teck’s request, the district 
court certified its order for interlocutory appeal.18 Teck timely 
appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
arguing that there is no disposal, as the Court of Appeals 
interpreted that term in CCAEJ, and hence no CERCLA 
liability “when waste is initially emitted to the air, and then is 
transported by wind into land or water.”19 If the Court of 
Appeals overrules the district court’s order in Pakootas II, 
plaintiff tribes may have no recourse under federal law for the 
contamination of their land and water by defendant’s long 
term aerial emissions of hazardous substances, and Teck may 
escape liability for contaminating the tribes’ land. 
Pakootas II is a case of first impression because in “over 30 
years of CERCLA jurisprudence, no court has impliedly or 
expressly addressed the issue of whether aerial emissions”20 
that contaminate a site give rise to CERCLA arranger liability; 
rather, “it appears to have been treated as a given” that 
CERCLA liability attaches.21 Moreover, according to the EPA, 
there are hundreds of sites similar to Teck’s, where a smelter’s 
aerial emissions result in the release of hazardous substances 
that contaminate a site;22 smelters and other industrial 
facilities may escape federal liability for the contamination 
they cause if the Ninth Circuit reads a hole in coverage into 
the law. 
In order to frame the legal controversy, Part II of this 
comment provides background information on the relevant 
provisions of CERCLA, RCRA, and the Clean Air Act, and 
presents a brief summary of the physical and legal history of 
the Teck Cominco smelter and the Upper Columbia River site. 
Part III of this comment analyzes the controversy by 
examining the statutes themselves, as well as recent 
                                               
17. Id. (holding that Teck’s “arranger liability” arose from the release “of a 
hazardous substance” not from its smelter but from wastes deposited on “the UCR Site 
located in the United States.”). 
18. Id. at 4. 
19. Petition for Permission to Appeal at 14, Joseph Pakootas, et al v. Teck Cominco 
Metals, Ltd., No. 1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2015). 
20. Pakootas II, No. CV-04-256-LRS, slip op. at 3. 
21. Id. 
22. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae as to Defendant’s Motion 
for Reconsideration at 1, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 
2014 WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2140). 
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developments in the case law regarding arranger liability. 
While the statutes and the case law establish liability on their 
own, Part III also looks to the legislative history and finds 
confirmation that Congress intended for entities such as Teck 
to face liability under CERCLA for their releases of hazardous 
substances. 
This comment develops the argument that aerial emissions 
of hazardous substances that contaminate sites should be 
subject to CERCLA’s remediation and liability provisions, in 
accordance with the language of the statutes, the overall 
statutory framework, the courts’ interpretation of the statutes, 
and congressional intent. Part IV concludes that proper 
construction of CERCLA arranger liability fills this potential 
hole in the law, allowing injured parties or the government to 
remediate sites contaminated by the otherwise legal emission 
of air pollutants, and placing the costs where they belong, on 
the responsible party. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To frame the issues, this section first outlines the purpose, 
scope, and select provisions of the Clean Air Act, CERCLA, 
and, to a lesser degree, RCRA. Next, this background section 
provides an overview of the Teck Cominco smelter and the 
Upper Columbia River site, and briefly summarizes the long 
history of litigation between the parties, leading to the current 
controversy. 
A. Statutory Provisions 
To appreciate the controversy, it is important to understand 
the overall reach of the complicated statutes involved, as well 
as the relevant statutory terms and provisions that frame the 
specific issue of CERCLA arranger liability in the context of 
sites contaminated by aerial emissions. As with many federal 
environmental statutes, a plethora of terms of art are defined 
in the statutes and through common use; the key terms are 
described below. The statutes are discussed below in the order 
they were enacted—because CERCLA was enacted last, this 
progression gives context to the congressional intent 
underlying CERCLA, and informs the present controversy. 
6
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1. The Clean Air Act 
On December 31, 1970, Congress enacted the modern Clean 
Air Act23 as a major amendment to the Air Pollution Control 
Act of 1955.24 Passage of the Clean Air Act was prompted by 
recognition that “the growth in the amount and complexity of 
air pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial 
development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has 
resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and 
welfare.”25 The express purpose of the Clean Air Act was 
therefore to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s 
air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare 
and the productive capacity of its population.”26 Because “the 
Clean Air Act was enacted and amended for the purpose of 
protecting public health,”27 its focus was naturally on limiting 
emissions to improve or maintain ambient air quality. 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
administers the Clean Air Act.28 EPA describes the “key 
elements”29 of the Clean Air Act as: 
[R]educing outdoor, or ambient, concentrations of air 
pollutants that cause smog, haze, acid rain, and other 
problems; 
[R]educing emissions of toxic air pollutants that are 
known to, or are suspected of, causing cancer or other 
serious health effects; and 
[P]hasing out production and use of chemicals that 
destroy stratospheric ozone.30 
Thus, two of the major prongs of the Clean Air Act are 
aimed at protecting overall ambient air quality, which is 
measured with reference to “criteria air pollutants,”31 and 
                                               
23. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
24. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (2012). 
26. Id. § 7401(b)(1). 
27. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 415 F. Supp. 799, 805 (W.D. Mo. 1976), 
aff’d sub nom., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977). 
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 7402 (2012). 
29. EPA OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, THE PLAIN ENGLISH 
GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT, Publication No. EPA-456/K-07-001, 1, 4 (2007), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/peg.pdf. 
30. Id. 
31. Criteria air pollutants are those pollutants “emissions of which, in [the EPA 
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reducing emissions of “hazardous air pollutants.”32 The Clean 
Air Act protects ambient air quality by directing the EPA to 
enumerate criteria air pollutants33 and develop national 
ambient air quality standards34 (NAAQS) that “define the 
levels of air quality that must be achieved to protect public 
health and welfare.”35 Furthermore, the EPA must promulgate 
NAAQS at concentrations protective enough to ensure “an 
adequate margin of safety.”36 Related provisions require states 
to develop “implementation plans,”37 to achieve “attainment,”38 
or “prevent significant deterioration,”39 of ambient air quality. 
The Clean Air Act, as amended, also lists 190 hazardous air 
pollutants and directs the EPA to promulgate National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS) 
for these chemicals.40 NESHAPS limit the concentration of 
pollutants emitted at the source to reduce hazardous “air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an 
increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or 
incapacitating reversible, illness.”41 To enforce the standard, 
the EPA must first “promulgate technology-based emission 
standards for categories of sources that emit”42 hazardous air 
pollutants. Every eight years thereafter, EPA must “review, 
and revise as necessary . . . emission standards promulgated 
under this section.”43 
                                               
Administrator’s] judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
Criteria air pollutants are the subject of id. §§ 7408–7409. 
32. Hazardous air pollutants are those pollutants that “present, or may present, 
through inhalation or other routes of exposure, a threat of adverse human health 
effects . . . or adverse environmental effects” other than criteria air pollutants. Id. § 
7412(b)(2). Hazardous air pollutants are enumerated and described in id. § 7412. 
33. “There are currently six criteria air pollutants: carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen 
oxides, ozone, particulate matter, and sulfur oxides.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 
EPA, 749 F.3d 1079, 1083 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7408. 
35. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 469 (2004); accord 42 
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
37. Id. § 7424. 
38. Id. §§ 7501–7515. 
39. Id. §§ 7470–7492. 
40. Id. § 7412. 
41. Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
42. Id. at 980. 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(6) (2012). 
8
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss1/7
36 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:1 
 
Both the NESHAPS and the NAAQS provisions require the 
EPA and the states, respectively, to regulate and control the 
emission of air pollutants based on health and welfare effects 
associated with the resultant concentration of pollutants in the 
ambient air. The risk calculations used to set the allowable 
emission limits are based on concentrations of pollutants in the 
localized44 and regional ambient air,45 respectively. 
2. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
On October 21, 1976, Congress enacted the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 as a major amendment 
to the Solid Waste Disposal Act.46 Congress enacted RCRA to 
close a “loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated 
land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous wastes.”47 
As relevant here, “RCRA’s primary purpose is to reduce the 
generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the proper 
treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is 
nonetheless generated, so as to minimize the present and 
future threat to human health and the environment.”48 RCRA, 
which “is a sweeping statute intended to regulate solid waste 
from cradle to grave,”49 “empowers EPA to regulate hazardous 
wastes . . . with the rigorous safeguards and waste 
management procedures of Subtitle C,”50 and to regulate 
nonhazardous solid waste “much more loosely under Subtitle 
D.”51 RCRA is administered by the EPA, which notes that 
RCRA primarily covers “active and future facilities and does 
not address abandoned or historical sites.”52 
                                               
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(1)(c) (instructing EPA to evaluate “the actual health 
effects with respect to persons living in the vicinity of sources”). 
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (instructing EPA to set “ambient air quality standards 
the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requisite to protect the public 
health” (emphasis added)). 
46. Pub. L. No. 89–272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965). 
47. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, 2d Sess. at 4 (1976). 
48. Titan Wheel Corp. of Iowa v. EPA, 291 F. Supp. 2d 899, 903-04 (S.D. Iowa 2003), 
aff’d sub nom., Titan Wheel Corp. of Iowa v. EPA, 113 F. App’x 734 (8th Cir. 2004). 
49. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 408 (1994). 
50. City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). 
51. Id. 
52. History of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/rcra/history-resource-conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
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In addition to its overall purpose and reach, the following 
RCRA definitions are relevant to the issue at hand. RCRA 
defines “disposal” as: 
[T]he discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, 
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous 
waste into or on any land or water so that such solid 
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof 
may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or 
discharged into any waters, including ground waters.53 
RCRA defines a “hazardous waste” as a: 
[S]olid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which 
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, 
chemical, or infectious characteristics may— 
(A) [C]ause, or significantly contribute to an increase in 
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or 
incapacitating reversible, illness; or 
(B) [P]ose a substantial present or potential hazard to 
human health or the environment when improperly 
treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise 
managed.54 
As noted above, a material can only be a RCRA hazardous 
waste if it is first a “solid waste,” which RCRA defines as “any 
garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water 
supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and 
other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or 
contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, 
commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from 
community activities.”55 Thus defined, RCRA contains 
provisions for active solid and hazardous waste generation, 
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to ensure proper 
management of such waste. 
3. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act 
Both RCRA and the Clean Air Act were already in place 
when, in the late 1970s, “public attention [focused] on a series 
of past improper hazardous waste disposal incidents such as 
                                               
53. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012). 
54. Id. § 6903(5). 
55. Id. § 6903(27) (emphasis added). 
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the tragedy of Love Canal, New York,”56 which has been 
described as “one of the most appalling environmental 
tragedies in American history.”57 Love Canal was “a municipal 
and industrial chemical dumpsite”58 located in a residential 
community that was “originally meant to be a [suburban] 
dream community.”59 Before nearby residents understood that 
contamination was present, children “returned from play with 
burns on their hands and faces,”60 and there was an 
abnormally high rate of birth defects, miscarriages, and “high 
white-blood-cell counts, a possible precursor of leukemia.”61 At 
the time the nature and extent of the problem became 
apparent, the federal government did not have statutory 
authority or a funding mechanism to address Love Canal, and 
the parties that contaminated it were not liable under any 
then-existing federal laws.62 
In response to this and other previously-contaminated sites, 
Congress ultimately enacted CERCLA to fill a hole in coverage 
“in then existing law by creating the authority and liability for 
cleanup of abandoned facilities contaminated with hazardous 
substances.”63 On December 11, 1980, Congress enacted 
CERCLA, as modified in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”),64 for two primary purposes: 
“to promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to 
ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by 
those responsible for the contamination.”65 The Congressional 
intent behind CERCLA must be inferred both because the 
                                               
56. Arnold & Porter LLP, Arnold & Porter LLP Legislative History: P.L. 96-510, Dec. 
11, 1980 [hereinafter A&PLH], 1980 WL 356126. 
57. Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA JOURNAL, 





62. Id. (EPA Region 2 Administrator, in the year before CERCLA was enacted, 
noting that Love Canal was ultimately cleaned up by the taxpayer using “the first 
emergency funds ever to be approved for something other than a ‘natural’ disaster,” 
lamenting “the missing link of liability,” and asking, generally, “Who’s going to pick up 
the tab” for cleaning up legacy contaminated sites?). 
63. J. B. Ruhl, The Plight of the Passive Past Owner: Defining the Limits of 
Superfund Liability, 45 SW. L.J. 1129, 1129 (1991). 
64. Pub. L. No. 99–499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
65. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009). 
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statute does not contain an explicit statement of purpose and 
because of the lack of a legislative history such as committee 
reports or congressional debate. The lack of legislative history 
results from the fact that CERCLA was hastily drafted in the 
“waning days of the lame-duck session of the 96th Congress,”66 
before both the presidency and control of the Senate passed 
from the Democrats to the Republicans. As a result, “some of 
CERCLA’s provisions are vague and its legislative history 
sparse.”67 This has led the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to 
note that “neither a logician nor a grammarian will find 
comfort in . . . [CERCLA’s] baffling language”68 and the 
Supreme Court to wryly suggest that CERCLA is “not a model 
of legislative draftsmanship.”69 CERCLA has been heavily 
litigated. Nevertheless, it is well established and oft repeated 
by the courts that Congress enacted CERCLA for two primary 
purposes: “prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and 
imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party.”70 
a. Authority to Act under CERCLA 
Upon a finding that “that there may be an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or 
the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance from a facility,”71 CERCLA authorizes the 
President to take “action . . . necessary to protect public health 
and welfare and the environment.”72 The statutory terms 
release, hazardous substance, and facility, all of which courts 
have interpreted broadly, are critical to the authority to act 
and the imposition of liability under CERCLA. 
CERCLA defines a “release” as “any spilling, leaking, 
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, 
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the 
environment . . . but excludes . . . emissions from the engine 
                                               
66. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt (Exxon Corp.), 475 U.S. 355, 380 n.5 (1986). 
67. CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 571 (W.D. Mich. 1991). 
68. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 883 (9th Cir. 2001). 
69. Exxon Corp., 475 U.S. at 363. 
70. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2012) (emphasis added, highlighting some key CERCLA 
terms of art). 
72. Id. 
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exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or 
pipeline pumping station engine.”73 As developed below, this 
exclusion may be significant for stationary sources of aerial 
emissions such as Teck’s smelter. 
CERCLA defined a “hazardous substance” broadly, by 
reference to substances designated under then-existing 
environmental laws including the Clean Water Act,74 RCRA, 
the Clean Air Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA),75 plus additional provisions that authorize EPA to 
designate “any element, compound, mixture, solution, or 
substance”76 as hazardous. While the definition of hazardous 
substances is wide-ranging, CERCLA specifically excludes 
“petroleum, including crude oil . . . natural gas, natural gas 
liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel 
(or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).”77 
CERCLA also defines a “facility” quite broadly, to include 
“any site or area where a hazardous substance has been 
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to 
be located; but does not include any consumer product in 
consumer use or any vessel.”78 
The President is authorized to perform “abatement 
actions”79 to control a release of a hazardous substance at a 
facility in accordance with the National Contingency Plan, 
which sets forth “procedures and standards for responding to 
releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and 
contaminants.”80 Abatement actions are defined quite broadly 
as securing “such relief as may be necessary to abate such 
danger or threat . . . [and] issuing such orders as may be 
necessary to protect public health and welfare and the 
environment.”81 The EPA may recover all costs of the “removal 
or remedial action”82 and “natural resources”83 damages, from 
                                               
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). 
74. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012). 
75. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2012). 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). 
77. Id. (“the petroleum exclusion”). 
78. Id. § 9601(9) (emphasis added). 
79. Id. § 9606. 
80. Id. § 9605(a). 
81. Id. § 9606(a). 
82. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
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potentially responsible persons (PRPs), the customary term of 
art for those potentially liable under CERCLA. 
b. Arranger Liability Under CERCLA 
Courts have held that CERCLA “is a strict liability 
statute”84 that “defines PRPs so broadly as to sweep in 
virtually all persons likely to incur cleanup costs.”85 CERCLA 
imposes liability for response actions and natural resource 
damages on four sets of “persons:”86 current and former facility 
owners, operators, and hazardous substance transporters, and 
“arrangers.”87 Because the class of owners, operators, and 
transporters is typically relatively straightforward, the 
interpretation of who may be an arranger has broad 
ramifications that define the ambit of CERCLA liability. 
CERCLA defines an arranger as “any person who by 
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for 
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or 
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any 
facility.”88 CERCLA does not define “otherwise arranged for,” 
but the plain meaning of the phrase, without textual 
limitation, suggests broad application. In some cases, whether 
a party arranged for disposal is unambiguous, as when a 
generator of hazardous substances pays a treatment facility to 
receive and manage the hazardous waste; however, in many 
cases it is not so clear whether a party is an “arranger” under 
CERCLA. Arranger liability is a high stakes game because 
those liable under Section 107 of CERCLA face potential “joint 
and several liability”89 for investigations and response actions 
that frequently amount to millions of dollars in expenses. 
                                               
83. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C). 
84. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 136 (2007). 
85. Id. 
86. CERCLA defines “persons” broadly, as “an individual, firm, corporation, 
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States 
Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any 
interstate body.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
88. Id. § 9607(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
89. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 140. 
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B. A Smelter, a River, Two Tribes, and a Controversy 
The current controversy surrounding arranger liability for 
sites contaminated by aerial emissions of hazardous 
substances is well framed in a case currently pending before 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which could have wide-
ranging repurcussions. The case involves a Canadian smelter 
near the border with the State of Washington, the Columbia 
River, and two tribes located in Washington. 
1. Physical and Sociological Setting 
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, owns 
and operates a smelter in Trail, British Columbia (the “Trail 
Smelter”), which is located “approximately 10 miles upstream 
from the U.S.-Canada border.”90 The Trail Smelter operations 
began over a hundred years ago, and between “1906 and 1995, 
Teck generated and disposed of hazardous materials, in both 
liquid and solid form, into the Columbia River.”91 These 
wastes, “including granulated slag, liquid effluent, and other 
discharges,”92 contained “arsenic, cadmium, copper, mercury, 
lead, and zinc,”93 and other hazardous materials. Teck 
historically made no efforts to downplay the prominence of its 
smelter’s smokestacks in the town of Trail, as evidenced by the 
name and logo of the company-sponsored, two-time World Ice 
Hockey Championship “Trail Smoke Eaters” hockey club.94 
The hazardous substances Teck released directly into the 
Columbia River from the Trail Smelter crossed the U.S. border 
and impacted “approximately 150 river miles of the Columbia 
River, extending from the U.S.-Canadian border to the Grand 
                                               
90. EPA, WORK PLAN FOR THE REMEDIAL INVESTIGATION AND FEASIBILITY STUDY, 
VOLUME I OF II 4-2 (2008), http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/cleanup.nsf/sites/upperc. 
91. Id. at 1-1. 
92. Id. 
93. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas I), 452 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
94. The former Trail Smoke Eater’s logo prominently featured the twin smokestacks 
of the Trail Smelter, rising above the surrounding (company) town of Trail. For 
information surrounding the discovery of valuable minerals near Trail, the 
development of the smelter and town, and information about the “Smokies” hockey 
team, see the Trail Historical Society’s websites: http://www.trailhistory.com/ and 
http://www.historicsmokeeaters.ca/ (last visited April 25, 2015). 
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Coulee Dam”95 (the “UCR Site”). The Grand Coulee Dam 
created “Lake Roosevelt, a large reservoir extending [up to 133 
miles north of the dam] and bordered by over 600 miles of 
shoreline, approximately 312 miles of which are part of the 
Lake Roosevelt National Recreation Area.”96 The remainder of 
the Lake Roosevelt shoreline is “managed by the Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Reservation . . . and the Spokane Tribe of 
Indians”97 (collectively, the “Tribes,” and, along with the State 
of Washington, “Plaintiffs”). The general public uses Lake 
Roosevelt for recreational activities including “boating, fishing, 
swimming, wading, camping, canoeing, and hunting,”98 and the 
River also “provides a subsistence fishery for Native American 
populations.”99 Named plaintiff Joe Pakootas is the elected 
Chairman of the Colville Tribe.100 
In 1999, the Tribes petitioned EPA to evaluate the UCR 
Site.101 EPA and its environmental consultants conducted 
several rounds of site investigations, including extensive 
records review, sediment sampling, and fish tissue sampling.102 
In 2003, EPA’s consultant completed a CERCLA Site 
Inspection report summarizing the investigations, and EPA 
determined that “the Upper Columbia River site was eligible 
for inclusion on CERCLA’s National Priorities List” (NPL).103 
The NPL, commonly referred to as the “Superfund List,” 
designates those sites that EPA determines are “top priorities 
for cleanup and are eligible for CERCLA-financed remedial 
                                               
95. EPA, supra note 90, at 1-2. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id at 1-3. 
99. Id. 
100. Joe Pakootas is currently also a candidate for the U.S. House of 
Representatives, who touts his “efforts to clean up the Columbia River which has 
suffered from heavy metal pollutants from a Canadian mining operation. The case is a 
landmark effort to protect international boundary and downstream waters and 
habitat.” PAKOOTAS FOR CONGRESS, http://www.pakootasforcongress.com (last visited 
April 25, 2015). 
101. Upper Columbia River Site Study, EPA,  
https://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/cleanup.nsf/sites/upperc (last visited June 7, 2016). 
102. See generally EPA, REGION 10: THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, Technical Documents, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/Cleanup.NSF/ UCR/Technical+Documents (last visited 
June 7, 2016) (containing links to several technical investigation reports and related 
documents). 
103. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 646 F.3d at 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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action.”104 Courts would later confirm that, “waste from the 
Trail Smelter [that came to rest] in the UCR Site adversely 
affects the surface water, ground water, sediments, and 
biological resources of the Upper Columbia River and Lake 
Roosevelt.”105 
2. Pakootas I 
On July 12, 2004, the Tribes filed a “Complaint for 
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and for Civil Penalties” in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Washington’s Spokane Court, which the State of Washington 
later joined.106 The Plaintiffs alleged that: (1) Teck “Released 
Slag Containing Hazardous Substances into the Columbia 
River;”107 (2) the slag was “toxic to humans and to aquatic 
life;”108 (3) Plaintiffs suffered damages; (4) the EPA had issued 
a Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) under CERCLA 
compelling Teck to conduct a detailed “Remedial 
Investigation/Feasibility Study”109 to investigate the 
environmental impacts and potential remedial measures; (5) 
Teck had not complied with the UAO; and (6) EPA “failed to 
enforce the UAO.”110 Plaintiffs sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, civil penalties, and attorneys’ fees. On 
November 8, 2004, the circuit court denied Teck’s motion to 
dismiss.111 While the case was on appeal, EPA and Teck 
settled.112 On July 3, 2006, in Pakootas v. Teck Cominco 
Metals, Ltd. (Pakootas I),113 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Teck’s motion for 
dismissal, holding that: 
                                               
104. Id. 
105. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). 
106. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and for Civil Penalties at 1, 
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-0256-AAM (E.D. Wash. July 12, 
2004), 2004 WL 2646770. 
107. Id. at 3. 
108. Id. at 4. 
109. Id. at 5. 
110. Id. at 6. 
111. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-AAM, 2004 WL 
2578982, at *17 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) aff’d, 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 
112. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 646 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011). 
113. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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1) The UCR Site is a CERCLA “facility” because the 
slag has “‘come to be located’ there”;114 
2) The “leaching of hazardous substances from the slag 
at the Site is a CERCLA release,”115 and that release 
is “domestic”;116 
3) Teck, despite being a Canadian corporation, qualified 
as “any person”117 within the meaning of CERCLA; 
and 
4) “Teck is potentially liable . . . [as an arranger] for 
disposal of its slag.”118 
Thus, Pakootas I settled several fundamental issues of 
Teck’s CERCLA liability for the release resulting from the slag 
that came to rest in the river at the UCR Site, including: the 
UCR Site was a CERCLA facility; Teck was a CERCLA person; 
the court had personal subject matter jurisdiction over the 
Canadian company; and Teck “could be liable as [an] arranger 
under CERCLA even though it had disposed of slag itself,”119 
originally from the Trail Smelter in Canada. Pakootas I also 
held, in a “case of first impression,” that the CERCLA release 
occurred at the UCR Site when hazardous substances leached 
from the slag in the river into the site sediments and waters. 
120 In other words, the CERCLA release occurred from the 
material deposited in the river, not from the original release of 
slag from the Trail Smelter into the Columbia River, more 
than 10 miles upstream from the UCR Site and outside of U.S. 
jurisdiction.121 The Supreme Court denied Teck’s Petition for 
writ of certiorari.122 The litigation, though, had just begun.123 
                                               
114. Id. at 1074. 
115. Id. at 1075. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1076. 
118. Id. at 1082. 
119. Id. at 1066 (internal quotations omitted). 
120. Richard Du Bey et al., CERCLA and Transboundary Contamination in the 
Columbia River, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 8, 8 (2006). 
121. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the “Upper 
Columbia River Site is” the CERCLA “facility”). 
122. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. v. Pakootas, 552 U.S. 1095 (2008). 
123. As of April 25, 2015, there have been 14 additional court decisions or orders, 
and the Pakootas docket now contains more than 2000 items. Litigation remains 
ongoing. Washington, U.S. District Court (Spokane), Civil Docket for Case #: 2:04–cv–
00256-LRS. 
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On December 14, 2012, the district court ultimately held 
Teck liable as an arranger under CERCLA for releases at the 
UCR Site resulting from Teck’s disposal of slag and other 
material into the river.124 Relevant findings included: “Teck 
knew its disposal of hazardous waste into the UCR was likely 
to cause harm;”125 there “have been releases and threatened 
releases of hazardous substances into the environment from 
slag . . . [that is] located at the UCR Site;”126 and, “when a 
waste (rather than a useful product or potentially useful 
product) is discarded, intent to dispose need not be proved.”127 
Additionally, the district court concluded that disposal 
occurred not when the slag was released from Teck’s Canadian 
smelter into the river (which would not give rise to CERCLA 
liability due to extra-territoriality), rather, disposal occurred 
when”at least some portion of [Teck’s] slag and effluent came 
to a point of repose at the UCR Site.”128 In other words, the 
court found Teck liable for their waste material after it had 
been transported by natural processes to the water bodies at 
the UCR Site, where it released contaminants into the water 
and sediment. 
3. Pakootas II 
On March 17, 2014, Plaintiffs amended their Complaint 
alleging that the UCR site was impacted not only by slag 
transported via the river, but also that: 
From approximately 1906 to the present time, Teck 
Cominco emitted certain hazardous substances, 
including, but not limited to, lead compounds, arsenic 
compounds, cadmium compounds and mercury 
compounds into the atmosphere through the stacks at 
the Cominco Smelter. The hazardous substances, 
discharged into the atmosphere by the Cominco Smelter 
travelled through the air into the United States 
resulting in the deposition of airborne hazardous 
                                               
124. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2012 WL 
6546088, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 14, 2012). 
125. Id. at *12. 
126. Id. at *16 (internal quotations omitted). 
127. Id. at *17 (citing Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 609–10 (2009)). 
128. Id. at *18. 
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substances into the Upper Columbia River Site.129 
Plaintiffs argued that Teck’s “discharges into the 
atmosphere . . . travelled through the air and resulted in 
disposal into the [UCR] Site of . . . hazardous substances,”130 
which then were released into the environment at the UCR 
Site. Plaintiffs requested relief under CERCLA for 
reimbursement of investigation and clean-up costs, as well as 
natural resource damages.131 
On April 3, 2014, Teck filed a motion to strike or dismiss the 
claims related to the aerial emissions.132 Teck argued that 
“aerial emissions do not constitute disposal under 
CERCLA,”133 “Teck did not arrange to dispose of its aerial 
emissions,” and therefore, Teck was not liable under CERCLA 
for the uncontested release of hazardous substances at the 
UCR Site traceable to Teck’s aerial emissions at the Trail 
Smelter.134 On July 29, 2014, the district court denied Teck’s 
motion.135 On Sept 24, 2014, Teck filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration in light of the Court of Appeals’ holding in 
CCAEJ that diesel particulate matter emitted into the air from 
a rail yard did not result in the “disposal” of solid waste under 
RCRA.136 Teck argued that its aerial emissions similarly did 
not constitute disposal, and therefore, Teck was not liable 
under CERCLA.137 On November 19, 2014, the United States 
filed an amicus curia, arguing that Teck’s Motion was “based 
on an erroneous, overbroad reading of [CCAEJ] . . . and ignores 
                                               
129. The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation’s Fourth Amended 
Complaint at 4, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 
WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2099). 
130. Id. at 8. 
131. Id. at 4. 
132. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion to Strike, or in the Alternative Dismiss the New 
Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaints Pursuant to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 12(f) and 12(b)(6) at 4, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 
CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2104). 
133. Id. at 2 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). 
134. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
135. Order Denying Motion to Strike or Dismiss, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, 
Ltd., No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 
2115). 
136. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to 
Strike or Dismiss (Oral Argument Requested), Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 
No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2118). 
137. Id. at *1. 
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the unique circumstances of [CCAEJ] – a citizen suit under . . . 
[RCRA] that was primarily aimed at controlling air 
emissions.”138 On December 31, 2014, the district court denied 
Teck’s motion and certified its order for appeal.139 Teck timely 
appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,140 
which recently agreed to hear the case and granted Teck’s 
Motion to Appeal.141 
4.  The Nature and Breadth of the Controversy 
According to the amicus brief filed by the United States in 
Pakootas II, there are hundreds of sites similar to Teck’s, 
where a smelter’s aerial emissions result in the release of 
hazardous substances that contaminate a site.142 Presumably, 
there may be many more non-smelter industrial facilities that 
discharge hazardous substances into the air, and threaten 
public health, and may warrant CERCLA response action.143 
In certifying for interlocutory appeal its order finding Teck 
liable, the district court noted that in “over 30 years of 
CERCLA jurisprudence, no court has impliedly or expressly 
addressed the issue of whether aerial emissions leading to 
disposal of hazardous substances . . . are actionable under 
CERCLA.”144 The court opined that, historically, “it appears to 
have been treated as a given.”145 Because, as discussed below, 
the current Supreme Court may be receptive to arguments for 
scaling back the reach of CERCLA, the outcome of this case 
could determine whether Congress’ dual purpose in enacting 
CERCLA could be frustrated for sites such as these, by 
hampering the cleanup of contaminated sites and failing to 
hold the polluters accountable. 
                                               
138. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 1. 
139. Pakootas II, No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Wash. 
Dec. 31, 2014). 
140. Petition for Permission to Appeal at 14, Joseph Pakootas, et al v. Teck Cominco 
Metals, Ltd., No. 1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2015). 
141. Order, Joseph Pakootas, et al v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. 5 (9th Cir. Mar. 
25, 2015). 
142. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 22, at 1. 
143. Id. 
144. Pakootas II, 2014 WL 7408399, slip op. at 3. 
145. Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
As relevant here, a prima facie case for recovery of expenses 
or natural resources damages under Section 107 of CERCLA146 
requires a plaintiff to establish that: (1) the waste disposal site 
is a “facility” as defined in CERCLA,147 (2) “a release or 
threatened release of any hazardous substance from the 
facility has occurred,”148 (3) the release or threatened release 
caused the plaintiff to either “incur response costs that are 
consistent with the national contingency plan,”149 or suffer 
natural resources damages,150 and (4) the “defendant is within 
one of four classes of persons subject to” CERCLA’s liability 
provisions.151 
Often the first element is not disputed, because a “facility” is 
broadly defined to include sites controlled by defendants or 
their contractors: “any site or area where a hazardous 
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or 
otherwise come to be located.”152 It is less clear, however, 
whether a contaminated site that the defendant did not own or 
operate and at which defendant did not contract for disposal is 
a CERCLA facility. Whether such a site is a CERCLA facility 
is a fact-specific inquiry, and similar cases have been decided 
differently.153 Ultimately, most courts have historically set a 
low bar for finding that a site is a facility. The Ninth Circuit 
                                               
146. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to 
Strike or Dismiss (Oral Argument Requested), Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 
No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 2118). 
147. 3550 Stevens Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank of California (Stevens Creek), 
915 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2014 (1991). 
148. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)) (internal quotations omitted). 
149. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4), 9607(a)(4)(B)) (internal quotations omitted). 
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). 
151. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1358. 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(3). 
153. See, e.g., Kane v. United States, 15 F.3d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
building with asbestos materials installed inside is not a CERCLA facility because 
“Congress intended to provide recovery only for releases or threatened releases from 
inactive and abandoned waste sites, not releases from useful consumer products in the 
structure of buildings” (internal quotations omitted)); but see, Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d 
1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) (a similar asbestos-in-a-building case where liability did lie 
and the court stated that “the term facility has been broadly construed by the courts, 
such that in order to show that an area is a facility, the plaintiff need only show that a 
hazardous substance under CERCLA is placed there or has otherwise come to be 
located there”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Court of Appeals set a particularly undemanding standard 
when it held that “in order to show that an area is a facility, 
the plaintiff need only show that a hazardous substance under 
CERCLA is placed there or has otherwise come to be located 
there.”154 The UCR Site certainly passes this low bar, as would 
other similar sites where hazardous aerial emissions settle. 
While evaluating the slag and other material that flowed 
down the Columbia River and eventually contaminated the 
UCR Site, the appeals court in Pakootas I found that “the 
passive migration of hazardous substances into the 
environment from where hazardous substances have come to be 
located is a release under CERCLA.”155 In other words, the 
CERCLA facility was the site where the materials that caused 
the release came to rest, not necessarily the place from which 
the materials were originally discharged (the Trail Smelter). 
This logic applies no less to material transported through the 
air (the aerial emissions in Pakootas II) than material 
transported through the water (the slag and other discharges 
in Pakootas I). 
The second element, a release or threatened release of any 
hazardous substance from the facility, is a factual finding that 
a plaintiff must establish. This is typically accomplished by 
conducting a Preliminary Assessment and Site Inspection, 
and, if warranted, a Remedial Investigation.156 These CERCLA 
investigations most often involve reviewing historical records, 
investigating sites, including collecting environmental samples 
and submitting them to laboratories for analysis, and modeling 
of the fate and transport of the hazardous substances.157 The 
Pakootas I court specifically found that the CERCLA release 
from waterborne materials occurred at the UCR Site, not at 
the smelter where the materials were first discharged.158 The 
                                               
154. Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1360. 
155. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). 
156. See Superfund Cleanup Process, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cleanup-process (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
157. Id. 
158. Pakootas I, 452 F.3d at 1075, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1095 (2008) (affirming the 
lower court’s Order that described the CERCLA facility as the “[UCR] Site, not the 
Trail Smelter in Canada or the Columbia River in Canada” where the hazardous 
substances were first released, and concluding that “[w]e hold that the leaching of 
hazardous substances from the slag at the [UCR] Site is a CERCLA release. That 
release—a release into the United States from a facility in the United States—is 
entirely domestic,” and therefore subject to CERCLA.). 
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exact same reasoning should apply in Pakootas II to the 
putative CERCLA release at the UCR Site resulting from the 
deposition of airborne materials. Indeed, the parties do not 
dispute that there was a release of hazardous substances at 
the UCR Site traceable to Teck’s aerial emissions at the Trail 
Smelter.159 
The third element, necessary response costs (and possibly 
natural resources damages), is also primarily a factual 
inquisition. Generally, a plaintiff must show that remediation 
costs were “necessary,”160 a standard that “requires that an 
actual and real threat to human health or the environment 
exist before initiating a response action.”161 This element was 
not in dispute in Pakootas I, and is not in dispute in Pakootas 
II.162 
Therefore, as is often the case for releases from industrial 
facilities such as the Teck Smelter, the first three elements of 
CERCLA liability are not disputed. Here, the UCR Site is a 
CERCLA “facility,” and, at this stage of litigation, the parties 
neither dispute whether there was a release nor whether a 
response is warranted. Therefore, because Teck does not own 
or operate the contaminated UCR Site, the dispositive issue for 
CERCLA liability is the fourth element of the prima facie case: 
whether the defendant arranged for disposal of hazardous 
substances. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling on Teck’s arranger 
defense could have enormous consequences.163 
A.  In Purposefully Discharging Hazardous Substances from 
the Trail Smelter Stacks, Teck Arranged for Disposal 
Under CERCLA 
Historically, courts widely held that “a liberal judicial 
interpretation of the term [arranger] is required in order that 
                                               
159. See generally Pakootas I, 452 F.3d at 1069 (discussing whether a CERCLA 
“disposal” occurred, but silent on whether there was a release and whether the release 
was traceable to Teck’s emissions, because these issues were not raised by the parties). 
160. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2001). 
161. Id. 
162. See generally Pakootas I, 452 F.3d 1066, and Pakootas II, No. CV–04–256–LRS, 
2014 WL 7408399 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014) (discussing several legal questions, but 
not the necessity of response actions nor the existiance of natural resource damages, 
because these issues were not raised by the parties). 
163. See text accompanying note 142, supra. 
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we achieve CERCLA’s ‘overwhelmingly remedial’ statutory 
scheme.”164 The oft-cited opinion by the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp. 
is typical: “Congress used broad language in providing for 
liability for persons who ‘by contract, agreement, or otherwise 
arranged for’ the disposal of hazardous substances.”165 The 
Aceto court declined to interpret arranger liability “in any way 
that apparently frustrates the statute’s goals, in the absence of 
a specific congressional intent otherwise.”166 The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals similarly held that “arranger liability was 
intended to deter and, if necessary, to sanction parties seeking 
to evade liability by contracting away responsibility.”167 
Traditionally, courts overwhelmingly employed a liberal 
interpretation of arranger liability even though CERCLA 
liability is “strict, joint, and several,”168 which might otherwise 
engender restraint in imposing liability. 
Against this backdrop of liberal interpretation of “arranger” 
in the courts of appeals, the Supreme Court considered the 
reach of arranger liability “for the first time”169 in Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States,170 on 
appeal from the Ninth Circuit. Burlington Northern involved 
Brown & Bryant, Inc. (“B&B”), an agricultural chemical 
distributer that purchased pesticides and other chemicals from 
Shell Oil Company and others.171  B&B began its operations in 
1960 and eventually expanded its operations onto Burlington 
Northern’s adjacent property.172 B&B mixed, stored, and 
transported pesticides and other chemicals that were released 
                                               
164. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 
1990); accord United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.Supp. 898, 902 
(D.N.H. 1985). 
165. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 
1989) (emphasis in original). 
166. Id. 
167. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 670 F.3d 377, 382 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
168. Petro-Chem Processing, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.2d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
169. Peter J. McGrath Jr., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., et al. v. 
United States: Defining Environmental Law or Changing It?, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 85, 
89 (2011). 
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over time into the environment and contaminated the 
groundwater aquifer beneath the sites with hazardous 
substances.173 By 1989, B&B became insolvent, and the site 
was added to the NPL.174 The State of California and the EPA 
(the “Governments”) exercised their authority under CERCLA 
and analogous State law to undertake cleanup efforts at the 
site.175 By the time of trial, the Governments had already spent 
more than $8 million and Burlington Northern had incurred 
more than $3 million performing remediation.176 
Burlington Northern brought suit for recovery under Section 
107 of CERCLA against B&B, and the Governments brought 
suit both against Burlington Northern as an owner and 
against Shell as an arranger for disposal.177 The Governments’ 
suits were consolidated.178 At the conclusion of a four-year 
trial, the district court held179 that both Burlington Northern 
and Shell were liable “under CERCLA—the Railroads because 
they were owners . . .and Shell because it had arranged for the 
disposal of hazardous substances through its sale and delivery 
of”180 pesticides and chemicals that B&B released during their 
routine commercial operations. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals first recognized that Shell was not “a 
traditional arranger”181 who contracted for disposal. However, 
the court held that Shell was liable “under a broader category 
of arranger,”182 because Shell’s disposal of hazardous wastes 
was “a foreseeable byproduct of”183 its activities. The court 
stated further that “arranger liability was not precluded by the 
fact that the purpose of Shell’s action had been to transport a 
                                               
173. Id. 





179. In addition to the arranger liability issue, Burlington Northern is also 
frequently cited for its other landmark holding that liberalized the ability of courts, 
which previously primarily imposed joint & several liability, to apportion costs under 
CERCLA. The apportionment issue is not analyzed in this paper. 
180. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 605 (internal quotations omitted). 
181. Id. at 606. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 606–07. 
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useful and previously unused product to B & B for sale.”184 The 
Court of Appeals stated that broadly construed arranger 
liability “accords with the statutory language and structure as 
a whole,” and specifically held that the CERCLA definition of 
disposal includes unintentional activities and “need not be 
purposeful.”185 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and went on to issue 
its seminal Burlington Northern decision on May 4, 2009.186 
The Court began by agreeing with the Court of Appeals that 
analysis of arranger liability “is fact intensive and case 
specific,”187 but signaled a reluctance to interpret the statute 
broadly when it stated that, “such liability may not extend 
beyond the limits of the statute itself.”188 The Court therefore 
held that “mere knowledge that spills and leaks continued to 
occur”189 was not enough to establish liability. Finding no 
statutory definition for the CERCLA term “arrange,” the Court 
looked to the ordinary (dictionary) meaning, and concluded 
that arrange “implies action directed to a specific purpose.”190 
The Court acknowledged that “in some instances an entity’s 
knowledge that its product will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or 
otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entity’s intent 
to dispose of its hazardous wastes,”191 but went on to hold that 
“knowledge alone is insufficient to prove that an entity 
‘planned for’ the disposal, particularly when the disposal 
occurs as a peripheral result of the legitimate sale of an 
unused, useful product.”192 The Court thus absolved Shell of 
arranger liability.193 
                                               
184. Id. at 607 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). 
185. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 949 (9th Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (internal quotes and brackets omitted) (quoting 
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 880 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
186. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599 (2009). 
187. Id. at 610. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 613. 
190. Id. at 611 (finding a requirement of intent to dispose in the definition of 
arrange: “to make preparations for: plan; to bring about an agreement or 
understanding concerning” (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 64 
(10th ed. 1993)). 
191. Id. at 612. 
192. Id. 
193. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 619 (2009). 
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Justice Ginsberg dissented, explaining that Shell’s activities 
“necessarily and immediately resulted in the leakage of 
hazardous substances.”194 The dissent agreed with the Court of 
Appeals that relieving “Shell of any obligation to pay for the 
cleanup . . . is surely at odds with CERCLA’s objective—to 
place the cost of remediation on persons whose activities 
contributed to the contamination rather than on the taxpaying 
public.”195 
The Burlington Northern Court’s interpretation of the 
statutory language threatens to change the landscape for 
CERCLA arranger liability if it is understood to universally 
require a showing of “intent . . . to dispose of a hazardous 
substance”196 in what was widely and uniformly regarded as a 
strict liability scheme. Furthermore, the holding appears to 
require specific “intent to dispose of . . . hazardous wastes”197 
rather than an entity’s mere “knowledge that its product will 
be leaked, spilled, dumped, or otherwise discarded.”198 This 
change in the landscape “heighten[s] the burden for 
establishing arranger liability.”199 
Indeed, many PRPs have escaped arranger liability since the 
Court’s decision in Burlington Northern.200 However, while the 
Supreme Court has narrowed arranger liability in general, 
even the most demanding construction of this new test should 
not establish a hole in coverage big enough for a PRP such as 
Teck to slip through. As a threshold matter, the discharge of 
                                               
194. Id. at 622 (Justice Ginsberg, dissenting) (brackets omitted). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 611. 
197. Id. at 612. 
198. Id. 
199. Greg DeGulis, Sarah Gable, Burlington Northern: CERCLA and Its Ever-
Changing, Unpredictable Landscape, 28 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 40, 40 (2014). 
200. See, e.g., Vine St. LLC v. Borg Warner Corp., 776 F.3d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(finding no arranger liability for a supplier of dry cleaning chemicals who knowingly 
but unintentionally discharged chemicals in its wastewater); Team Enterprises, LLC 
v. W. Inv. Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding a 
“manufacturer of a machine used in the dry cleaning process” not an arranger when 
their customer, a dry cleaner, “disposed of this wastewater by pouring it down the 
sewer drain”); City of Merced Redevelopment Agency v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1:08-
CV–714–LJO–GSA, 2015 WL 471672, slip op. at 26 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015) (finding no 
arranger liability when oil companies sold “MTBE-containing gasoline” that 
contaminated a city’s groundwater because the buyer stored the gasoline in leaking 
underground storage tanks because the PRPs “did not intend to dispose of a hazardous 
substance”). 
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pollutants from an industrial stack cannot be described as 
unintentional, in any sense of the word. Indeed, such stacks 
are purposefully designed to extend far above ground precisely 
in order to disperse hazardous substances and other industrial 
waste products over great distances, thereby decreasing their 
concentrations at any given point near the stack. Similarly, 
facilities are purposefully operated to ensure that airborne 
emissions are delivered into the stacks. The design, 
permitting, construction, and continued operation of industrial 
stacks can only be described as “intentional steps to dispose of 
a hazardous substance.”201 These intentional acts should easily 
satisfy the Burlington Northern test for arranger liability. 
Furthermore, while a number of PRPs have cited Burlington 
Northern to successfully evade arranger liability,202 a 
significant number of these successful defendants escaped 
under the well-established “useful products doctrine,” which 
pre-dates Burlington Northern.203 Under the useful product 
doctrine, a PRP is not liable for transactions involving a 
commercial product before it becomes waste subject to 
CERCLA,204 when it was the subsequent owner of the useful 
product who caused the release of hazardous substances.205 
                                               
201. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 600 (2009). 
202. See, e.g., United States v. Fed. Res. Corp., No. 2:11–CV–00127–BLW–RC, 2014 
WL 3400477 (D. Idaho July 14, 2014) (holding that the U.S. was not an arranger for 
the disposal of mine waste when it encouraged the plaintiff to establish a mine at a 
site, permitted the mine, and “knew the tailings were dumped on-site and could have 
but failed to direct proper disposal of the tailings to prevent pollution”); Gregory Vill. 
Partners, L.P. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. C 11–1597 PJH, 2012 WL 832879, at *9 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012) (finding that a county sanitary district was not an arranger 
when it “installed and maintained a sewer line, and imposed a fee on property owners 
for access to the sewer line” that conveyed and discharged hazardous substances.); 
Celanese Corp. v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., 620 F.3d 529, 530 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding 
that a construction company was not an arranger when its employee accidentally and 
unknowingly struck and damaged a pipeline with a backhoe, when years later the 
pipeline broke and released methanol). But see United States v. Dico, Inc., 892 F. 
Supp. 2d 1138, 1157 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (holding a company that sold PCB-contaminated 
buildings liable as an arranger, dismissing defendant’s useful products doctrine 
argument because the products were actually sold “for the purpose of disposing of 
hazardous waste”). 
203. Compare supra note 200. 
204. A & W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); 
accord State of Cal. on Behalf of State Dep’t of Toxic Substances v. Summer Del 
Caribe, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
205. See, e.g., Team Enterprises, LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901, 
913 (9th Cir. 2011); Hinds Investments, L.P. v. Team Enterprises, Inc., No. CV F 07–
0703 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 1663986, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010). 
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One could argue that the Court should have decided 
Burlington Northern on the basis of the useful products 
doctrine alone and need not have read additional requirements 
into CERCLA arranger liability. Indeed, many of the post-
Burlington Northern defendants who failed to escape arranger 
liability were those who were not covered by the useful product 
doctrine.206 
Industrial polluters such as Teck, who operate their 
smokestacks in a manner that contaminates downwind 
properties, should not escape the repercussions of their actions 
based on Burlington Northern’s apparent departure from 
CERCLA’s well-established strict liability scheme. Such a 
result would thwart the very purpose for which Congress 
included arranger liability within CERCLA. However, if such a 
defendant has a colorable case, they may wish to press the 
issue to a potentially receptive Supreme Court. As noted 
above, while the Court could have simply decided Burlington 
Northern on the well-established useful products doctrine, the 
Court went further and stated that “under the plain language 
of the statute, an entity may qualify as an arranger . . . when it 
takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.”207 
Despite this apparent limitation, one could reasonably 
interpret the phrase “may qualify” as merely identifying 
sufficient cause for arranger liability in useful product cases, 
i.e., “when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the 
legitimate sale of an unused, useful product.”208 Therefore, 
although many courts appear to have interpreted Burlington 
Northern’s intent to arrange for disposal as a necessary 
finding,209 Burlington Northern’s intent requirement should be 
                                               
206. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 670 F.3d 377, 385 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(finding arranger liability when defendant “viewed scrap Pyranol as waste material 
and that any profit it derived from selling scrap Pyranol to Fletcher was subordinate 
and incidental to the immediate benefit of being rid of an overstock of unusable 
chemicals”); Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 764–65 (6th Cir. 
2014) (accepting the lower court’s holding that companies who sent materials to a 
landfill “arranged to have contaminants placed on the Site”); Arkema Inc. v. Anderson 
Roofing Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Or. 2010) (denying defendants motion to 
dismiss for “dispos[al] of wastes at a common oil sump disposal facility” when “such 
wastes are present in the sediments at the Portland Harbor Site”). 
207. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 611 (2009) (emphasis added). 
208. Id. at 612. 
209. See, e.g., Team Enterprises, LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Trust, 647 F.3d 901, 
909 (9th Cir. 2011); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 781 F.3d 129, 155 
(4th Cir. 2015); Vine St. LLC v. Borg Warner Corp., 776 F.3d 312, 317 (5th Cir. 2015); 
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limited to its facts, and applied only to cases involving 
arranger liability for the seller of useful products. Accordingly, 
because Teck intentionally released hazardous substances 
through stacks constructed and operated for the express 
purpose of transporting its airborne industrial waste far away 
from the smelter, Teck’s argument that it did not “arrange” for 
disposal of hazardous substances via aerial emissions should 
fail. 
B. Teck’s Deposition of Airborne Hazardous Substances upon 
the Land and Water at the UCR Site Constitutes Disposal 
Under CERCLA 
Teck should not evade liability under CERCLA for 
contaminating the UCR Site merely because it first discharged 
the pollutants into the air. In the district court, Teck argued 
that the CERCLA definition of disposal, “the discharge, 
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any 
solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or 
water,”210 omitted aerial emissions from the ambit of CERCLA 
disposal. Teck further contended that the CCAEJ holding 
confirms that “emissions of solid waste directly into the air”211 
cannot comprise disposal. Relatedly, Teck also argued that 
Congress did not intend CERCLA to address contamination 
resulting from aerial emissions both because “the [Clean Air 
Act] addressed air emissions”212 and because CERCLA relied 
on RCRA’s definition of disposal, and RCRA had not “sought to 
address”213 air pollution. As demonstrated below, however, 
                                               
NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 706 (7th Cir. 2014), reh’g 
denied (Nov. 5, 2014). 
210. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012). 
211. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to 
Strike or Dismiss at 3, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (No. 2118), 2004 WL 
2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004). 
212. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion to Strike, or in the Alternative Dismiss the New 
Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaints Pursuant to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 12(f) and 12(b)(6) at 8–9, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (No. 
2104), 2004 WL 2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004) (citing S. Rep. No. 94-988, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), in turn referencing an EPA report that indicated “legislative 
controls over land disposal of hazardous wastes are inadequate” but “air and water 
pollution control authorities are adequate,” U.S. EPA, Report to Congress: Disposal of 
Hazardous Wastes, Pub. No. SW-115 (1974)). 
213. Teck Metals Ltd.’s Motion to Strike, or in the Alternative Dismiss the New 
Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaints Pursuant to Federal Rules of 
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these arguments miss the mark and should not absolve Teck of 
responsibility for contaminating the UCR Site. 
1. Teck’s Reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s Rejection of a RCRA 
Suit to Enforce Ambient Air Quality Standards is 
Misplaced; the Deposition of Airborne Contaminants on 
the UCR Site Constitutes Disposal 
In CCAEJ, the Ninth Circuit was called on to decide 
“whether the citizen-suit provision of . . . RCRA . . . may be 
used to enjoin the emission from Defendants’ railyards of 
particulate matter found in diesel exhaust.”214 CCAEJ 
plaintiffs argued that “particles are inhaled by people both 
directly and after the particles have fallen to the earth and 
then have been re-entrained into the air by wind,”215 causing 
“elevated cancer risk”216 to the surrounding community. 
CCAEJ plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief 
under RCRA, arguing that “diesel particulates constitute solid 
waste and hazardous waste, the handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of which Defendants have 
contributed or are contributing to.”217 CCAEJ defendants 
countered that air emissions and ambient air quality are 
subject to the Clean Air Act,218 not RCRA, because “even if 
Congress had intended RCRA to apply in this context . . . 
Defendants did not emit diesel exhaust into or on any land or 
water, and therefore were not disposing of solid waste within 
the meaning of RCRA.”219 
The CCAEJ court analyzed the legislative history of RCRA 
and the Clean Air Act, and concluded that “RCRA, in light of 
its purpose to reduce the volume of waste that ends up in our 
nation’s landfills, governs land disposal. The Clean Air Act, by 
                                               
Civil Procedure 12(f) and 12(b)(6) at 8, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (No. 
2104), 2004 WL 2578982 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004). 
214. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co. (Ctr. for Cmty. Action), 
764 F.3d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). 
215. Id. at 1021. 
216. Id. (brackets omitted). 
217. Id. at 1021–22. 
218. The Clean Air Act’s citizen suit provisions only apply to air permitting decisions 
and violations of air permits, which would not have helped the Ctr. for Cmty. Action 
plaintiffs. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604. 
219. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1022. 
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contrast, governs air pollutants.”220 Furthermore, the court 
concluded that “railyards, as indirect sources of air pollution, 
are excluded from regulation under both statutory schemes.”221 
The court therefore found that Congress intentionally left this 
hole in coverage,222 and concluded that “emissions such as 
those at issue here—emissions from indirect sources like 
railyards—fall entirely outside the ambit of federal 
regulation.”223 Teck argues that the holding of the CCAEJ 
court that aerially “emitting diesel particulate matter from 
[Defendants] railyards and intermodal facilities . . . [does not 
amount to disposal] of solid waste in violation of RCRA,”224 
immunizes Teck from CERCLA liability due to the purported 
lack of disposal associated with Teck’s air emissions. 
However, CCAEJ must be understood in the contexts of its 
facts and the aims of its parties. CCAEJ plaintiffs, left with no 
recourse under the Clean Air Act,225 sought to use RCRA’s 
citizen suit provision to remedy emissions “discharged into the 
air . . .[containing] particles [that] are inhaled by people.”226 
Therefore, CCAEJ plaintiffs used the fact that some of the 
particles were deposited on the ground prior to being “re-
entrained into the atmosphere”227 in order to ground their 
citizen suit in RCRA. However, CCAEJ plaintiffs’ goal was to 
enjoin the defendant’s pollution of the ambient air; they did not 
allege a disposal or release at any site.228 The CCAEJ court 
concluded that RCRA “disposal does not extend to emissions of 
                                               
220. Id. at 1029 (internal quotations omitted). 
221. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
222. Id. at 1029 (Noting that that “statutory and legislative histories . . . make clear 
that RCRA . . . governs ‘land disposal.’ The Clean Air Act, by contrast, governs air 
pollutants,” and that “the histories further clarify that Defendants’ railyards, as 
‘indirect sources’ of air pollution, are excluded from regulation under both statutory 
schemes”). Note that neither the Ctr. for Cmty. Action parties nor the court mentioned 
CERCLA. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 1030. 
225. The Clean Air Act authorizes citizen suits only for: violation of air emission 
standards, EPA orders enforcing emissions standards, failure of the EPA to perform 
non-discretionary duties, and permit violations. 42 USCS § 7604(a) (2012). None of 
these situations applied to CCAEJ. 
226. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1019. 
227. Id. 
228. The Ctr. for Cmty. Action parties did not mention and the court did not consider 
CERCLA. 
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solid waste directly into the air.”229 While it could be argued 
that the CCAEJ court improperly applied the definition of 
disposal,230 its overall conclusion was sound: “the regulation of 
emissions from locomotives and railyards was governed solely 
by the Clean Air Act,”231 and the Clean Air Act specifically 
exempted “regulation of [indirect] sources like Defendants’ 
railyards.”232 The CCAEJ court thus found a congressionally 
considered and intended hole in coverage for these indirect 
sources and declined to stretch RCRA to address ambient air 
quality impacts. 
This hole in coverage for aerial emissions from railyards 
under the Clean Air Act and RCRA, however, should not be 
widened by allowing a facility like Teck’s industrial smelter to 
avoid CERCLA liability for contaminating the UCR Site. 
Unlike the situation in CCAEJ, which was an attempt to 
enjoin activities that affected ambient air quality, the situation 
in Pakootas II involves a contaminated site, including land and 
water. This is precisely the hole in coverage in then-existing 
federal law that CERCLA was enacted to fill, and the release 
of hazardous substances at the UCR Site lies squarely within 
the ambit of CERCLA. The RCRA definition of disposal 
includes depositing “any solid waste or hazardous waste into or 
on any land or water.”233 The deposition of airborne hazardous 
substances on the UCR Site falls within the plain meaning of 
deposit: to “let fall or drop by a natural process: foster the 
accretion or accumulation of . . . to become precipitated: settle . 
                                               
229. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1024. 
230. The Ctr. for Cmty. Action court held that: 
The text of § 6903(3) is also very specific: it limits the definition of disposal to 
particular conduct causing a particular result. By its terms, disposal includes only 
conduct that results in the placement of solid waste into or on any land or water. That 
placement, in turn, must be so that such solid waste may enter the environment or be 
emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. We 
therefore conclude that disposal occurs where the solid waste is first placed into or on 
any land or water and is thereafter emitted into the air. 
Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d at 1024 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations, citations, and 
ellipses removed; emphasis in original). The court cited no authority for its conclusion 
that waste must first be placed into or on any land for RCRA to apply. This judicial 
reconstruction of the statute, though arguably improper, was not required for the court 
to hold that the Clean Air Act and not RCRA, governs ambient air quality, and may 
therefore be considered dicta (if not erroneous). 
231. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2014). 
232. Id. 
233. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012). 
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. . something laid, placed, or thrown down; esp matter 
deposited by some natural process . . . a natural 
accumulation.”234 The deposition (or precipitation) of airborne 
solid particles upon the land is a natural process, scientifically 
driven by differences in density and temperature, that results 
in the accumulation (or deposition) of the solid material. Teck 
constructed and operated its stacks precisely in order to 
dispose of its hazardous industrial waste at a site far distant 
from Teck’s smelter. The hazardous substances were no less 
disposed at the UCR Site because they were first discharged 
into the air and then deposited upon the land then had Teck 
directly dumped its hazardous substances at the UCR Site. 
2. Congress Crafted CERCLA to Cover Contamination at 
Sites Such as UCR 
The limitations imposed on polluters under the Clean Air 
Act were crafted to “protect and enhance the quality of the 
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and 
welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”235 The 
Clean Air Act does not address contaminated sites in any way. 
Similarly, RCRA was crafted to assure “that hazardous waste 
management practices are conducted in a manner which 
protects human health and the environment,”236 not to address 
previously-contaminated sites. Thus, in the first part of the 
CCAEJ decision the court found that RCRA “governs land 
disposal . . . [while the] Clean Air Act, by contrast, governs air 
pollutants.”237 The court found that “emitting diesel particulate 
matter into the air does not constitute disposal as that term is 
defined under RCRA.”238 Rather than stopping there, in the 
second part of the CCAEJ decision, the court nevertheless 
considered plaintiffs’ argument that RCRA and the Clean Air 
Act should be “harmonized”239 to fill the hole in coverage that 
left the railyards emissions unregulated. However, the court 
                                               
234. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
605 (3d ed. 2002). 
235. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b). 
236. Id. § 6902(4). 
237. Ctr. for Cmty. Action, 764 F.3d 1019, 1029 (9th Cir. 2014). 
238. Id. at 1025. 
239. Id. at 1022. 
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noted that during the “1977 overhaul”240 of the Clean Air Act, 
which was enacted a year after the passage of RCRA and three 
years before CERCLA, EPA and Congress expressly considered 
air emissions from both the general class of indirect sources 
and the specific subclass of railyards, and declined to regulate 
them under the Clean Air Act. The CCAEJ court declined to 
fill this hole in coverage, reasoning “any ‘gap’ was the product 
of a careful and reasoned decision made by Congress that we 
are not at liberty to disturb.”241 Congress crafted CERCLA, 
however, to fill just such a hole in coverage, when it results in 
contamination of a site that threatens human health and the 
environment.242 
CERCLA was enacted precisely to enable remediation of 
sites contaminated by industrial hazardous waste, such as the 
UCR Site. Thus, as the district court held in Pakootas II, the 
CERCLA disposal occurred not at the point of “aerial emissions 
from Teck’s smelter.”243 Rather, the CERCLA disposal occurred 
when the hazardous substances in the air were “deposit[ed] . . . 
into or on any land or water . . . [where it could] enter the 
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any 
waters, including ground waters.”244 This is in accord with the 
RCRA definition of disposal, which includes depositing. The 
ensuing CERCLA release245 occurred when the hazardous 
substances emitted, discharged, leached, or otherwise escaped 
into the environment from the materials deposited on the UCR 
Site. 
3. The Statutory Language Confirms that Congress Intended 
CERCLA to Address Sites Contaminated by Aerial 
Emissions from Stationary Industrial Sources 
It is particularly noteworthy that CERCLA, like the Clean 
Air Act as discussed above, expressly excludes liability for 
                                               
240. Id. at 1027. 
241. Id. at 1030. 
242. See Part III.C., infra (detailing how the congressional history confirms that 
Congress intended CERCLA to address contaminated sites by filling in the holes in 
coverage left by RCRA, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act). 
243. Pakootas II, No. CV–04–256–LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Wash. 
Dec. 31, 2014). 
244. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2012). 
245. See the CERCLA definition of “release” at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). 
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releases due to “emissions from the engine exhaust of . . 
.rolling stock.”246 This CERCLA exclusion for liability 
stemming from emissions from rolling stock (railroad cars), as 
well as certain other categories of aerial emissions, i.e. “a 
motor vehicle, . . . aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station 
engine,”247 conclusively shows that Congress did consider 
aerial emissions as potential sources of hazardous substances. 
Moreover, the fact that Congress expressly exempted a few 
categories of aerial emissions from CERCLA clearly evidences 
Congress’ conscious decision that other categories of aerial 
emissions do fall squarely within the ambit of CERCLA. To 
hold otherwise would offend logic and fundamental canons of 
statutory construction. 
First, the familiar canon expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius248 applies here—because Congress expressly excluded 
some classes of aerial emissions from CERCLA liability, it 
logically and necessarily follows that Congress considered the 
issue of aerial emissions in the CERCLA context and that 
Congress intended other classes of aerial emissions to give rise 
to CERCLA liability. Furthermore, because each enumerated 
exemption relates to vehicles or petroleum (the latter of which 
enjoys a blanket exclusion from CERCLA), it can be reasonably 
inferred that industrial point sources of hazardous air 
emissions, such as the Trail Smelter, are precisely the kind of 
emissions not excluded from CERCLA liability. Second, if, as 
Teck argues, all sources of aerial emissions are categorically 
immune from CERCLA liability despite their contamination of 
sites, then the exemption in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)(B) for certain 
classes of aerial emissions becomes mere surplusage, a result 
that the Supreme Court has recognized should be avoided in 
order to give effect to congressional intent.249 Finally, as the 
                                               
246. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)(B). 
247. Id. 
248. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (Defining expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius as a “canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies 
the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative”). The Supreme Court recognized this 
canon when it “accept[ed] the proposition that when a statute limits a thing to be done 
in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode.” Christensen v. Harris 
Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 582–83 (2000) (internal brackets and quotations omitted) (quoting 
Raleigh & G.R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. 269, 270 (U.S. 1871)). For more recent Supreme 
Court affirmations of this well-established canon, see Arizona v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492 (2012), and POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
249. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 304 (2009) (stating that “a statute should 
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Supreme Court recently held, provisions should be constructed 
with reference to their “wider statutory context;”250 it is a 
“fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of 
a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their 
place in the overall statutory scheme.”251 Here, CERCLA’s 
liability provisions should be read with reference to the whole 
act,252 which is structured to ensure “prompt cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites and imposition of all cleanup costs on 
the responsible party.”253 Exclusions in CERCLA coverage 
should not be read into that act,254 absent clear indications of 
congressional intent, which are not present here. 
C. The Congressional History Confirms that Congress 
Intended CERCLA to Address Contaminated Sites by 
Filling in the Holes in Coverage left by RCRA, the Clean 
Water Act, and the Clean Air Act 
While the language and structure of the statute are 
sufficient to establish that CERCLA was intended to cover 
releases of hazardous substances due to aerial emissions of 
industrial waste, the sparse legislative history also confirms 
this intent. On June 13, 1979, President Carter transmitted to 
Speaker O’Neill draft legislation intended to fill holes in 
coverage in existing environmental law to “address some of the 
most significant environmental and public health problems 
facing our Nation.”255 This proto-CERCLA legislation was 
                                               
be construed to give effect to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, void or insignificant” (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)). 
250. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2448 (U.S. 2014). 
251. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015). 
252. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (stating: “We believe it 
fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context 
of the whole Act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in interpreting legislation, we 
must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but should look to 
the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy”). 
253. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 815 n.6 (1994). 
254. This should be particularly true for CERCLA cases, which have historically 
been understood to fall under the long-established canon that “remedial statutes are to 
be liberally construed,” Michael Sinclair, TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 96 (2013). However, plaintiffs should not unduly rely on this long-
established canon, as discussed infra in the text accompanying note 277. 
255. A&PLH, supra note 54, CERCLA-LH 2, at 1979 WL 211356 (Westlaw) 
(Communication From The President Of The United States Transmitting A Draft Of 
Proposed Legislation To Amend The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, As 
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envisioned as an amendment to RCRA and the Clean Water 
Act.256 In the ensuing year, the House considered, but did not 
pass, several related bills.257 The stalemate ended shortly after 
the 1980 elections when the Republicans won control of the 
presidency and the Senate from the Democrats, and the “bill 
which became CERCLA passed the Senate on November 24, 
1980, after only a few days of debate.”258 The Senate bill that 
would become CERCLA was a complete rewrite of (although 
presented as an amendment to) House Bill 7020.259 The 
compromise bill “was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan 
leadership group of senators”260 during the waning days of the 
lame duck Congress. The House subsequently passed the 
Senate bill with “very limited debate, under a suspension of 
the rules, in a situation which allowed for no amendments.”261 
The Senate offered the bill to the House “on a take it-or-leave 
it basis,”262 with only forty minutes allotted for debate, much of 
which was taken by the bill’s sponsors.263 As such, CERCLA’s 
legislative history is relatively sparse. The information that is 
in the record, however, confirms Congress’ intent to pass “a 
                                               
Amended, And The Solid Waste Disposal Act, As Amended, To Provide A System Of 
Response, Liability, And Compensation For Releases Of Oil, Hazardous Substances, 
And Hazardous Wastes, To Establish A Response And Liability Fund, And For Other 
Purposes (June 13, 1979)). 
256. Id. 
257. See, e.g., H.R. 5790, the putative “Hazardous Waste Response Fund Act of 
1979,” A&PLH, supra note 56, CERCLA-LH 38, at 1979 WL 211371 (Westlaw); and S. 
1480, A&PLH, supra note 56, CERCLA-LH 65, 1979 WL 211383 (a bill to “provide for 
liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances 
released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal 
sites”). 
258. Peter J. McGrath Jr., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., et al. v. 
United States: Defining Environmental Law or Changing It?, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 85, 
85 n.2 (2011). 
259. Alfred R. Light, Clean Up of a Legislative Disaster: Avoiding the Constitution 
Under the Original CERCLA, 37 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 197, 199 (2014) 
(describing “an entirely different ‘compromise bill’,” which was drafted in a few days, 
during which time “no committee or subcommittee hearings, open or closed, were held. 
No committee reports or bill drafts were printed. Nothing resembling the usual process 
of congressional debate occurred. All discussions and negotiations took place behind 
closed doors”). 
260. Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 1 (1982). 
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good bill which filled a legislative void,”264 and without which 
there was “no authority . . . [or] funding to deal with certain 
types of hazardous waste spills and hazardous waste dangers 
to health and to the environment.”265 As one commentator 
noted, “the congressional committees which [sic] worked on the 
Superfund legislation were the same committees which [sic] 
worked on the 1980 amendments to RCRA,”266 and posited that 
“the two legislative enactments are continuous and should be 
read in this fashion.”267 The fact that the same congressional 
committees amended RCRA and drafted CERCLA, the 
statement that CERCLA fills a void, and the accelerated 
passage of the bill, combine to suggest that RCRA terms were 
adopted for convenience in the rushed drafting session. 
Reference to RCRA definitions were not intended to limit the 
broad aim of CERCLA, considering there is ample evidence 
that CERCLA was intended to fill any void or hole left by 
RCRA and other environmental laws regarding previously-
contaminated sites. 
While nothing in the legislative history indicates that aerial 
emissions as a whole do not fall under the ambit of CERCLA, 
the Senate compromise bill did expressly limit “the liability of 
vessels, trucks, trains and aircraft.”268 This concession was 
deemed necessary to ensure passage of the bill, but, as 
discussed above, also tends to indicate that other (particularly 
stationary) aerial hazardous substance releases were intended 
to give rise to liability, just like any other release of hazardous 
substances.269 Indeed, during debate of a predecessor Senate 
bill, the bill was described as a response to “staggering losses 
to our Nation and to our economy from toxic poisons, whether 
the medium involved was the air, surface waters, or ground 
waters. The sources of these toxins included industrial 
accidents, intentional releases through smokestacks and 
discharge pipes, and seeps from abandoned dumps.”270 
                                               
264. Id. at 33. 
265. J.P. Sean Maloney, A Legislative History of Liability Under CERCLA, 16 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 517, 538–39 (1992). 
266. Grad, supra at 35. 
267. Id. 
268. Maloney, supra note 260, at 533. 
269. Id. at 537. 
270. A&PLH, supra note 56, CERCLA-LH 84, at 1980 WL 356067 (Westlaw) 
(Proceedings and Debates of the 96th Cong., 2d Sess., July 25, 1980). 
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The Senate rewrote House Bill 7020 in part because the 
House bill was “too narrow because it dealt only with 
abandoned hazardous waste sites.”271 The Senate bill, 
conversely “provides authority to respond to more kinds of 
releases than the House passed version,”272 and “did address 
the broader problem of hazardous waste spills generally.”273 
The Senate compromise bill “added response authority for 
hazardous substances which are not hazardous wastes . . . 
[and] in doing this the Senate had expanded the scope of H.R. 
7020.”274 Thus, CERCLA was concerned with more than simply 
disposal sites covered by RCRA. Any disposal limitation in 
RCRA, therefore, should be loosely interpreted in the CERCLA 
context, in light of the clear congressional intent to address 
sites contaminated by hazardous substances. 
Finally, “it was the intent of the bill that the federal 
government’s cleanup and containment capability be viewed as 
something of an appeal of last resort, in the absence of any 
other adequate and timely response”275 under other existing 
laws. The bill therefore was aimed at “assuring that those 
responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury 
from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions . . . [and] 
providing ample Federal response authority to help clean up 
hazardous chemical disasters.”276 The very purpose of 
CERCLA was to fill in the holes in then-existing 
environmental law, providing authority for federal action and 
ensuring that polluters pay. Absent clear congressional intent, 
a new hole in coverage should not be read into our 
environmental laws to allow the unmitigated contamination of 
sites via the air pathway and allow polluters to shirk their 
responsibility. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Hundreds of smelters like Teck’s, and an unknown number 
of other industrial facilities, have discharged toxic industrial 
                                               
271. Grad, supra at 22. 
272. Maloney, supra note 265, at 537. 
273. Grad, supra at 22. 
274. Id. at 31. 
275. Id. at 27. 
276. Id. at 8. 
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pollutants into the air in a manner that contaminated 
downwind sites. Congress enacted CERCLA to fill just such a 
hole in coverage left by other major federal environmental 
laws, to enable governments and innocent parties to remediate 
contaminated sites, and to make sure that the polluters pay. 
Reading an atextual hole in coverage into CERCLA that would 
allow polluters to evade responsibility for their actions would 
thwart the will of Congress and leave the rest of us holding the 
bill. 
Absent clear indication of Congressional intent to the 
contrary, our environmental statutes must be interpreted in a 
manner that is consistent with their terms and overall 
structure, and achieves their goals. Congress enacted the 
Clean Air Act to address the problem of ambient air pollution, 
not to address—and certainly not to thwart—efforts to respond 
to the serious problem of sites contaminated by hazardous 
substances. Congress enacted CERCLA to ensure prompt 
response to clean up contaminated sites and ensure that the 
responsible parties pay for the required remediation. Allowing 
a company to escape liability, when it discharges toxic 
industrial contaminants into the air that later deposit onto and 
contaminate land or water, is in direct contradiction of the 
legislative intent in enacting CERCLA and does not conform to 
its provisions. Until recently, PRPs never raised such a claim 
in court, and CERCLA has properly addressed many such 
sites. Many more similar sites continue to threaten human 
health and the environment, and a new hole in coverage 
should not be opened up to thwart federal response authority 
under CERCLA. In Pakootas II, the Ninth Circuit should give 
effect to CERCLA’s plain meaning, its overall structure, and 
the congressional intent to provide the means to clean up 
contaminated sites and ensure that the polluters pay. 
Finally, Plaintiffs in Pakootas II should recognize that some 
recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that some members of 
the Court may be willing to consider scaling CERCLA back. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs should take care to frame their arguments 
within the four corners of the statute and the plain meaning of 
the statutory terms. For example, Justice Kennedy recently 
penned an opinion for the Court expressing distaste for the 
“proposition that remedial statutes should be interpreted in a 
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liberal manner,”277 even though that proposition was well 
established during the first thirty years of CERCLA 
jurisprudence. The Court went on to find the lower court “in 
error when it treated this [proposition] as a substitute for a 
conclusion grounded in the statute’s text and structure.”278 
Similarly, the Court recently warned that CERCLA “liability 
may not extend beyond the limits of the statute itself.”279 In 
this case, there is ample support in the statute and in the 
common meaning of its terms to support CERCLA liability for 
persons that purposefully discharge hazardous substances into 
the air through industrial stacks, when those hazardous 
substances settle on and contaminate a site, threatening 
human health and the environment. 
 
                                               
277. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2185 (2014). 
278. Id. 
279. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. 599, 609 (2009). 
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